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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant Gene Francis Stuart appeals from the district court's
Memorandum Opinion on Petition for Post Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and for New
Sentencing Trial ("Memorandum Order") and the Judgment Dismissing Case With
Prejudice, denying relief from his successive post-conviction and/or habeas petition in
which he raised ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
The facts leading to Stuart's conviction for the first-degree torture murder of
three-year-old Robert Miller are detailed in State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 165-66, 715
P.2d 833 (1985) (Stuart I):
Appellant and Kathy Miller, the mother of the deceased victim,
Robert Miller, met in August, 1980, began dating, and subsequently
moved in together on September 20, 1980. Robert Miller was at that time
two years old, and he lived with appellant and his mother. Appellant then
assumed control over Robert. At that time the child was not yet toilet
trained, and much of the punishment imposed upon the child dealt with
this problem.
Appellant was a very dominant person and often critical of others
in his presence. He was a strict disciplinarian who required almost adult
behavior from Robert over the course of their relationship. Appellant and
Kathy Miller often argued about his treatment of Robert, and Ms. Miller
moved out of the premises several times after the child had been bruised
and beaten by the defendant.
In the spring and summer of 1981, appellant assumed primary
control over Robert, feeding, clothing and caring for him. Robert often
accompanied appellant to his place of business.
In late summer and early fall of 1981, appellant and Ms. Miller
began sharing the management duties at a small tavern near Orofino.

Appellant and Ms. Miller would work separate shifts, with Miller working
during the day and appellant working at night. Each would take care of
Robert while the other was working.
In October of 1980, there suddenly appeared bruises and blisters
on Robert's backside. In November of 1980, Robert had bruises across his
forehead and a black eye. Later in November, Robert sustained a tom and
cut ear. Various explanations were given by appellant for these injuries,
including a spanking with a stick for the backside bruises, and a tricycle
collision for the black eye. After the torn ear appeared, Ms. Miller moved
out because of the injuries to her son. Appellant later apologized and
convinced Miller to move back in. Ms. Miller apparently moved in and
out several times, at least some of which moves resulted from the force
used in Robert's discipline.
In March Robert's bottom, up the middle of his back, was covered
with bruises, which the defendant claimed resulted from a fall in the
shower. In April, Robert had bruises on his chin. Robert had little round
bruises on his chest in November of 1980 and September of 1981. These
bruises appeared because of appellant's habit of jabbing him in the chest
with a finger while scolding him.
Appellant had other unique requirements. He attempted to teach
Robert, a two year old, table manners, requiring that Robert learn to
properly use his fork (pick it up with the left hand, transfer it to the right
hand, etc.) and use his napkin to wipe his mouth after every bite. If Robert
failed to perform correctly, he was often made to stand in a corner. Other
requirements of Robert were that he look only at his plate, and replace his
fork on the table after every bite. Appellant demanded these movements
of Robert while failing to follow them himself. At one time appellant hit
Robert on the hand with his fork when he picked up the fork with the
wrong hand.
There were two behaviors exhibited by Robert that appellant
punished in particular. One was "boobing", roughly translated as pouting
or sulking. The other was wetting his pants. After Roberl would wet his
pants or exhibit any other unacceptable behavior, he would be given a cold
shower from which he would emerge shaking with cold and blue lips.
In May of 1981, Robert's penis was darkly bruised on the top and
bottom. There was no explanation for this injury. Also in May Robert's
bottom and head were bruised and scratched. Appellant explained that
Robert fell because the toilet seat broke when he sat on it. Also in May, a
silver dollar sized patch of hair was discovered as missing from Robert's
head. In early spring, Robert complained of a hurt left arm,although no
visible marks were seen.

On September 19, 1981, Ms. Miller was working the day shift at
the tavern with appellant caring for Robert. Appellant gave his version of
the events of that day at trial -- the only version available, since appellant
and Robert were alone during the day. Robert spent two hours at a
friend's house, where appellant picked him up and took him home. He
attempted to feed him lunch, but Robert refused to eat. According to
appellant, he then began poking Robert in the chest as punishment. He
then struck him in the chest with his fist, swatted him and directed him to
eat. Robert then proceeded to eat with no complaints. After Robert
finished eating, he was put down for a nap. According to appellant he
later went to check on him and found that Robert had vomited on the bed.
Appellant then bathed Robert and put him back down. However, he then
noticed that Robert's breathing was unusual. Appellant testified that at
this point Robert was still alive. He attempted mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation, and Robert again vomited. Appellant then purportedly
rushed Robert to the hospital. Robert was dead on arrival. Emergency
room personnel noted that Robert's body was cold, indicating the
possibility that he had been dead for longer than appellant's testimony
would indicate.
An autopsy was conducted upon Robert, which disclosed the cause
of death as internal hemorrhaging caused by the rupture of the liver. The
pathologist felt that this rupture was caused by more than one blow;
however, he admitted that a well placed single blow could have caused the
rupture. The pathologist also testified that death would have occurred
between one and one and a half hours after such injury, contradicting
appellant's testimony concerning the time frame of events of the
afternoon. A number of bruises were found on the victim's body, both
internal and external. These bruises were of differing ages. In addition,
Robert had suffered a subdural hematoma in the head region, which the
pathologist testified would have been caused only by a fair amount of
blunt trauma to the head. Also, X-rays taken of Robert indicated that he
had suffered a broken left arm several months before the date of death.
On October 13, 1981, Robert E. Kinney was appointed to represent Stuart.
(5114865, Supp. R., p.7.)' An Amended Information was filed charging Stuart with firstdegree murder by torture and a habitual offender sentencing enhancement. (5114865, R.,
pp.14-16.) Upon completion of his trial, a jury found Stuart guilty as charged (5114866,

' Because there are several records and transcripts involved in this appeal fiom several
different cases in -,
the state will refer to the records and transcripts by their
respective supreme court numbers.

R., p.70) and he pled guilty to the sentencing enhancement (#14865, p.81). The state
filed a Notice of Intent to Request Death Penalty. (#14865, R., pp.83-84.) After a
sentencing hearing, the district court found the state had proven two statutory aggravating
factors: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel and (2) the defendant
by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand has exhibited a
propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to
society. (#14865, R., pp.214-15.) After concluding, "it could find nothing in mitigation
which would outweigh the aggravated circumstances of this crime and this defendant,"
the court sentenced Stuart to death. (#14865, R., pp.216, 227-28.) On May 3, 1985,
Stuart's conviction and death sentence were affirmed on appeal. See

w.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's First Post-Conviction Case
With Kinney's assistance, Stuart filed his first post-conviction petition on June 3,
1986. (#17014, R., pp.163-77.)2 While the petition did not raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment, it did raise a claim based upon the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments contending the death sentence was "arbitrarily and
discriininatorily imposed . . . against an impoverished male." (#17014, p.168.) The
petition expressly noted Stuart "had been raised in an atmosphere of physical and mental
abuse and neglect, was impoverished and represented by Court appointed counsel at the
time of his trial." (#17014, R., p.169.) The petition further represented that at the time of
Stuart's sentencing, "the full extent of physical and mental abuse sustained by Petitioner
during his formative years, was not known to counsel, nor presented to the Court"

Stuart's first post-conviction case was filed under the same district court case number as
his underlying conviction and death sentence, #8495.

because Stuart "did not have the active support of family members, save and except for
his sister and mother, who did not then disclose to Petitioner's attorney the existence of
significant physical and mental abuse, sustained by petitioner during his childhood
ybrs." (#17014, R., p.169.) Stuart's petition was accompanied by an affidavit from
David Simmons, who reported that in late August or early September 1981, he had a
conversation with Stuart regarding Stuart's childhood. (#17014, R., pp. 178-81.)
The district court gave notice of its intent to summarily dismiss Stuart's petition.
(#17014, R., pp.189-95.) Expressly addressing Stuart's claim regarding his childhood,
the court concluded there was "insufficient evidence to raise a factual question" and,
alternatively, the "new evidence has little value, or weight, thus, it would probably not
change the conviction or sentence." (#17014, R., p.193.) Stuart responded by filing
additional affidavits and a formal response (#17014, R., pp.204-27), which included an
affidavit from Kinney averring he was "not completely aware of the full extent of
physical and mental abuse sustained by the defendant during his formative years" and
that Stuart "was then, and continues to be reluctant to speak concerning these events"
(#17014, R., p.216). The district court denied post-conviction relief.

(#17014, R.,

pp.234-41.) Addressing Stuart's claim, the court explained, "Considered as a whole, this
new evidence does not raise material questions of fact; especially when viewed against
the backdrop of the overwhelming evidence produced at trial. To be sure, this evidence
would not have probably affected the conviction or sentence." (#17014, R., p.240.)
On October 16, 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court.
v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 867, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990) (Stuart IT). Addressing Simmons's
affidavit, the Court concluded the information contained therein was "not 'unknown to

the defendant at the time of trial,' and the trial court found that the evidence probably
would not produce an acquittal or change the sentence."

Id. at

870. Addressing the

remaining affidavits, the Court concluded the district court did not e n because the
affidavits failed to meet the requisite standard.

Id.at 871-72.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Second Post-Conviction Case
With Kinney's assistance, Stuart's second post-conviction petition was filed
September 12, 1988, which contended government officials had recorded attorney-client
communications while he was in the Clearwater County Jail. (#18653, R., pp. 24-45.)
Relying upon the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UPCPA"), the state filed a
memorandum asserting the petition was an improper second petition. (#18653, R., pp.8593.) The district court entered an order indicating its intent to dismiss, concluding the
"newly discovered evidence" of alleged monitoring "fail[ed] to raise a substantial
question of fact which would change the conviction or sentencing" and, based upon I.C.

5

19-4908, that the petition was an improper second petition because Stuart failed to
establish the claims "were not available or known to the Petitioner at the time the original
petition was filed." (#18653, R., pp.94-103.) After Stuart responded, the district court
entered its final order dismissing post-conviction relief. (#18653, R., pp. 176-78.)
Relying upon I.C.

5

19-4908, on appeal, the supreme court determined Stuart's

successive petition was timely because "the facts surrounding the second petition were
not known to the appellant until the summer of 1988." Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932,
934, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990) (Stuart 111). Concluding there were material issues of fact
concerning the monitoring and recording of attorney-client conversations, the supreme
court also remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

Id.at 934.

On remand, the district court bifurcated the evidentiary hearing, concluding it
would first determine whether attorney-client conversations were actually monitored or
recorded. (#20060, Tr., pp.166-67.) After the evidentiary hearing, the district court
determined Stuart failed to meet his burden of establishing any attorney-client
conversations were monitored or recorded. (#20060, R., pp.537-70.)
On appeal, the supreme court concluded the district court erred when it found the
destruction of some phone logs was not attributable to the state and, because the state
allegedly concealed the existence of a taped conversation between Stuart and his sister
which allegedly would have led to the discovery of "surreptitious tape recording
sufficient to preserve the phone logs," the supreme court remanded the case with
instructions to give Stuart "the benefit of a favorable inference concerning the destroyed
evidence." Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814-17,907 P.2d 783 (1995) (Stuart IV).
On remand, Kinney was permitted to withdraw from Stuart's case and Scott M.
Chapman was appointed on November 9, 1995. (#26661, R., pp.40-44.) The district
court concluded the "favorable inference concerning the destroyed evidence" supported
Stuart's contention that attorney-client conversations were monitored andlor recorded,
and held another evidentiary hearing to determine whether the evidence at trial "had an
origin independent of the eavesdropping." (#26661, R., pp.75-84.) After the hearing, the
district court found the state had proven three exceptions to the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine, including:

(1) the independent source exception; (2) the inevitable

discovery exception; and (3) the attenuated basis exception. (#26661, R., pp.367-95.)
Therefore, the court entered judgment denying post-conviction relief.

(#26661, R.,

pp.396-97.) On December 4, 2001, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. Stuart v. State,
136 Idaho 490,36 P.3d 1278 (2001) (Stuart VI).
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Rule 60(b) Motion
While litigating his second post-conviction petition, with Kinney's assistance
prior to the second remand, Stuart filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment under
I.R.C.P. 60(b) in his first post-conviction case, contending State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721,
852 P.2d 87 (1993) -- in which the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a murder case because
the jury was not instructed on second degree murder by torture -- should be applied
retroactively to his case. (#21654, R., pp.1-11.) The district court denied Stuart's
motion. (#21654, R., pp. 17-19.) On February 15, 1996, the supreme court affirmed the
district court. Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436,438, 914 P.2d 933 (1996) (Stuart V) (citing
Fetterlv v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418-19, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991) ("holding new decision
on death penalty sentencing did not apply retroactively to already final case")).
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Federal Habeas Case
On January 17, 2002, with the assistance of new counsel, Stuart initiated federal
habeas proceedings by filing a Statement of Issues. (#34200, R., pp.405-10.) The federal
district court stayed Stuart's execution and formally appointed the Capital Habeas Unit of
the Federal Public Defender's Unit of Eastern Washington and Idaho as lead counsel on
January 18, 2002. (#34200, R., pp.412-16.) On June 24, 2002, Stuart signed a verified
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#34200, R., pp.418-504) asserting he was
"investigating and developing as yet unexhausted claims" including numerous ineffective
assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims (#34200, R., pp.500-01). On

November 14, 2002, pursuant to his motion, the federal court ordered that Stuart's federal
habeas case be held in abeyance and "stayed pending final determination of his Idaho
state court successive postconviction petition." (#34200, R., p.507.)
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Third Post-Conviction Case
On August 2, 2002, while his federal habeas case was pending, Stuart filed a
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andor Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial, containing
ten separate claims all based upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). (#34198, R.,
pp.5-16.) The district court granted the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal (#34198,
R., pp.50-51), concluding Ring is not retroactive in cases on collateral review. (#34198,
R., pp.3 19-22.) Stuart's appeal is pending before this Court.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Fourth Post-Conviction Case
On December 3, 2002, Stuart filed his instant Petition for Postconviction Relief
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, raising numerous ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel claims and prosecutorial misconduct claims. (#34200, R., pp.138.) In his final claim, Stuart also contended the length of time he has been confined
violates his due process rights and the Eighth Amendment. (#34200, R., pp.38-40.) The
state filed an answer (#34200, R., pp.282-89) and a ~ b t i o nfor Summary Dismissal
(#34200, R., pp.392-93) asserting Stuart had failed to establish he complied with the
requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719.
Addressing his prosecutorial misconduct claims, the district court determined,
based upon I.C. § 19-2719(5), that Stuart had failed to establish the claims were not

known or could not reasonably have been known when he filed his first post-conviction
petition.

(#34200, pp.652-54.)

Addressing the ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel claims, the district court determined, based upon I.C.

5

19-2719, that

the claims had not been filed within a reasonable time. (#34200, pp.656-57.) The district
court did not expressly address Stuart's claim regarding length of confinement.
Judgment dismissing Stuart's case was filed April 18, 2007. (#34200, R., pp.659-61.)
Stuart's Notice of Appeal was timely filed on April 23,2007. (#34200, R., pp.665-69.)

ISSUES
Stuart has stated the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Whether Idaho Code Section 19-2719 properly governs this case

2.

Assuming arguendo that Section 19-2719 does properly govern
this case, whether that statute's time bars apply or, alternatively,
whether they must be stmck as violating the state andlor federal
constitutions.

3.

Whether Idaho courts have jurisdiction to consider claims brought
pursuant to the Idaho constitutional right to habeas corpus.

4.

Whether the Idaho courts should reach the merits of Petitioner's
claims.

(Appellant's brief, p.vii.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Because Stuart's case is governed by I.C. $ 19-2719 and he has failed to make a
prima facie showing that his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not
known or reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first postconviction petition, or the claims were not filed within a reasonable time after
they were known or reasonably could have been known after he was appointed
two new attorneys years before the filing of his successive petition, is this Court
without jurisdiction to hear the claims, requiring dismissal of his appeal?

2.

Because Stuart's case is governed by I.C. 5 19-2719 and he has failed to make a
prima facie showing that his prosecutorial misconduct claims were not known or
reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction
petition, or the claims were not filed within a reasonable time after they were
known or reasonably could have been known after he was appointed two new
attorneys years before the filing of his successive petition, is this Court without
jurisdiction to hear the claims, requiring dismissal of his appeal?

3.

Because I.C. $ 19-2719 is Idaho's procedural mechanism for dealing with
successive post-conviction petitions in capital cases and was expressly enacted
with language that it should be retroactively applied, has Stuart failed to establish
I.C. $ 19-2719 violates ex post facto laws or state retroactivity laws?

4.

Because I.C. $ 19-2719(5) was expressly enacted with language that it should be
retroactively applied, is merely an expansion of the state writ of habeas corpus
that does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction, and Stuart does not
distinguish the numerous cases in which this Court has determined I.C. $ 19-2719

does not violate due process or equal protection, has he failed to establish a
violation of state retroactivity laws, Idaho's separation of powers doctrine, due
process and equal protection?

5.

Because he has failed to distinguish the controlling case in which this Court has
determined his claims cannot be filed in a habeas petition and the petition was not
filed in Ada County where he is being housed, has Stuart failed to establish the
merits of his claims should have been addressed as state habeas claims?

ARGUMENT
I.
Stuart Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel Claims Were Not Known Or Could Not Have Been Known When He Filed His
First Post-Conviction Petition, And That They Were Filed Within A Reasonable Time
Once Thev Were Known Or Reasonablv Could Have Been Known
A.

Introduction
Addressing Stuart's ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims,

the district court determined the claims "have not been asserted within a reasonable time"
because his second attorney, Scott Chapman, was appointed in 1995 and his present
attorneys were appointed on January 17, 2002, yet the successive petition was not filed
until December 3,2002. (#34200, R., p.657.)
While conceding that under I.C. $ 19-2719 "those claims were not timely filed"
(Appellant's brief, p.16),3 Stuart contends, based upon Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523,
535-36 (9" Cir. 2001), that because he had the same attorney, Robert Kinney, during his
trial, sentencing, appeal, first post-conviction case and appeal, he was prevented from
timely asserting his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims
(Appellant's brief, pp. 16-19).
Because Stuart has failed to make a prima facie showing that his ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims were not known and could not reasonably have been
known when he filed his first post-conviction case, he has failed to meet the dictates of
I.C. $ 19-2719. Even if he made the requisite prima facie showing, Stuart's ineffective
Admittedly, in another portion of his brief, Stuart contends, "he has raised those claims
within a wholly reasonable time after identifying them." (Appellant's brief, p.18.)
However, Stuart's subsequent contention is based upon the standard from Hernandez v.
133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), which addressed the timeliness
standard under the UPCPA, not I.C. $ 19-2719.

a,

assistance of trial counsel claims, like his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claims, were not filed within a reasonable time after they were known or reasonably
could have been known. Finally, Stuart's reliance upon Hoffman is misplaced because it
is a federal habeas case dealing with the doctrines of procedural default and its exceptions
and, therefore, has no application regarding whether this Court should continue to
regularly and consistently apply the dictates of I.C. § 19-2719. Because Stuart's petition
is a successive petition in a capital case and he has failed to comply with the dictates of
I.C. $ 19-2719, the state expressly requests that his appeal be dismissed.
B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court recently articulated the standard of review in appeals

stemming from the denial of post-conviction relief in capital successive petitions. "When
this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of
Idaho Code
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19-2719, the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to

directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 192719 have been met, and rule accordingly." Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51,55, 156 P.3d
552 (2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 575,51 P.3d 387 (2002)), remanded

on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---,128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008).
C.

Stuart's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Governed By I.C. 6 19-2719
Idaho Code

19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures

in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction
proceedings which are governed by the UPCPA, are civil in nature and governed by the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58

(1995). Idaho Code S, 19-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in
capital cases, hut acts as a modifier and "supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their
provisions conflict." McKinnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144 (1999);

m,127 Idaho at 470.
Specifically, I.C. S, 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. S, 19-2719(5),
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within
the time frame allowed by the statute."

Id.,120 Idaho at 807.

If a capital defendant fails

to comply with the specific requirements of I.C. S, 19-2719, including the specified time
limits, the issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[tlhe courts of Idaho shall
have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any
such relief." I.C. S, 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700.
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at
471. Even if the petitioner can demonstrate the claims were not known or could not
reasonably have been known, LC. S, 19-2719(5)(a) details the additional requirements that
must be met before the successive petition may be heard:
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a

precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material
facts stated under o a a or affirmation by credible persons with first hand
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or
which is not credible, must be s m a r i l y dismissed.
I.C.

5 19-2719(5)(a).

Failure to meet the requirements of I.C.

5 19-2719(5)(a) mandates

dismissal of the successive post-conviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-

Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably
been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable
time affer they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123
Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. If the petitioner
fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in I.C.

5 19-2719(5), the petition

must be summarily dismissed. I.C. 5 19-2719(5) specifically provides:
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section
and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived
such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been
known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such
claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. 5 19-2719:
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences."
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by
requiring that all collateral claims for relief . . . be consolidated in one
proceeding. . . ." We hold that the legislature's determination that it was
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational
basis for the imposition of the 42-daytime limit set for I.C. 5 19-2719.
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with

a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences.
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a criminal
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus
proceedings which prohibit piecemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in
a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded:
There can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all
known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly
procedure of the state courts," as that term is used in Fay v. Noia,[372
U.S. 391, 438, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963)l. No prisoner
has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. $2241
to insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a presumptively valid
criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision.
Id. at 45-46.
Idaho Code $ 19-2719 also has a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law.
The ability of a state to ensure that its judgments carry a measure of finality rather than
being subject to repetitive federal attack, depends in substantial measure on the regular
and consistent enforcement of state procedural rules and bars. Addressing the interplay
between state procedural bars and federal review, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v.
Mississipvi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988), refused to honor a state procedural bar. The Court
explained:
[W]e consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent
state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's sentence. "[Wle have
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a
federal question is itself a federal question." Henry v. Mississippi,379

U.S. 443, 447, [85 S. Ct. 564, 567, 13 L. Ed. 2d 4081 (1965). "[A] state
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly
or regularly followed.' Burr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 184
S. Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L. Ed. 2d 7661 (1964)." Ifathorn v. Lovorn, 457
U.S. 255, 262-263, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2426-2427, 72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982);
see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S. Ct. at 567-568. We
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi
Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather,
the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary.
Id. at 587.
The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. 5 192719, strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief claims
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of I.C. Fj 19-2719(5). See
Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 51 P.3d 387 (2002); Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 32
P.3d 151 (2001); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades v. State, 135
Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996);
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100,
897 P.2d 991 (1995); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); Fetterly v.

m,121 Idaho 417,825 P.2d 1073 (1991). The Court has also historically followed the
requirements of I.C. Fj 19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts'
dismissal of successive capital post-conviction claims because of petitioners' failure to
meet the narrow exceptions of I.C. Fj 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of
I.C.

$5

19-2719(5)(a) and (b). See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000);

Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8
P.3d 636 (2000); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,992 P.2d 144 (1999).

D.

Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims Were Known Or Reasonablv
Could Have Been Known When Stuart Filed His First Post-Conviction Petition
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claims are claims that were known or reasonably should have been known when
a petitioner files the first post-conviction petition.

m,127 Idaho at 472 ("A claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is also one that should reasonably be known
immediately upon the completion of trial"); &, 123 Idaho at 759-60 (same); Fetterly,
121 Idaho at 4 19 (same); see also Row, 135 Idaho at 578; Rhoades, 135 Idaho at 303.
Based upon the affidavits surrounding his Eighth Amendment claim, as detailed
above Stuart was aware of the factual basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. See Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420, 423, 80 P.3d 1021 (2003) ("the basis for
Porter's present claims were known or should have been known to him in the earlier
proceeding"). Additionally, this Court has already determined that, at least in part, the
underlying factual basis for Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims was "not
'unknown to the defendant at the time of trial."' Stuart 11, 118 Idaho at 870.
Because Stuart has failed to make the requisite prima facie showing that his
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were not known and could not have been
known when he filed his first post-conviction petition, this Court is without jurisdiction to
grant him relief, requiring dismissal of his appeal.
E.

Ineffective Assistance Of Trial And Appellate Counsel Claims Were Not Filed
Within A Reasonable Time
1.

Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims

Even if Stuart's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were not known and
could not reasonably have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition,

none of the claims have been asserted within a reasonable time after they were known or
reasonably could have been known.

In &, 123 Idaho at 760, the supreme court

recognized I.C. § 19-2719 "implicitly establishes a framework for timeliness" for the
filing of successive post-conviction petitions or claims. While not setting forth a specific
time frame, the supreme court concluded four years is not a reasonable period of time.
Id. In Dunlar, v. State, 131 1dahb 576, 577 961 P.2d 1179 (1998), the supreme court
concluded a petition filed within forty-two days after the appointment of new counsel
was a reasonable time "under the circumstances of [the] case." Recently, the supreme
court has concluded a petitioner failed to show "justifiable reason for the six-month delay
in filing" a successive post-conviction petition. Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299,301, 17
P.3d 243 (2000).~
Even if appointment of new counsel is required before an ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim can be raised, Stuart's claims were not timely filed because he was
appointed new counsel who could have raised his ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims well before December 3, 2002. Kinney was permitted to withdraw and Chapman
was appointed to represent Stuart on November 9, 1995. (#26661, R., pp.40-44.) On
January 17, 2002, the Federal Public Defender's Unit of Eastern Washington and Idaho
assisted Stuart in filing a Statement of Issues in federal court to initiate federal habeas

The state recognizes this Court has recently held, "a reasonable time for filing a
successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or
reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that
time period. In that event, it must be filed within a reasonable time after the claim was
known or knowable." Pizzuto v. State, --- Idaho ---,
---,--- P.3d ---,2008 WL 466568,
*6 (2008). However, "because [he] did not have advance notice of our further
clarification of what is a reasonable time," this new standard should not be applied to
Stuart. Id.

proceedings. (#34200, R., pp.405-10.) Nevertheless, even with new counsel having been
twice appointed to represent him, Stuart's successive petition was not filed until
December 3, 2002 (#34200, R, pp.1-38), nearly seven years after Chapman's
appointment and nearly one year after the Federal Public Defender's Unit assisted Stuart
in initiating his federal habeas proceedings. Under any standard, this is not a reasonable
time after the claims were known or reasonably should have been known.
2.

Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel Claims

Unlike ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, the Idaho Supreme Court has
concluded when the same attorney represents a capital defendant during the first appeal
and the first post-conviction case, the defendant is precluded from having the opportunity
to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the first petition.

Row, 135

Idaho at 579. However, as explained in Porter, 136 Idaho at 260, such claims "must be
asserted within a reasonable time after they are known or reasonably could have been
known." The starting date for determining what constitutes a reasonable period of time is
the filing date of the defendant's appellate brief. Hairston, 144 Idaho at 57. Stuart's
opening appellate brief was filed September 9, 1983, but his instant successive petition
was not filed until December 3, 2002, more than nineteen years later. As in Hairston, and
the cases cited therein, nineteen years does not constitute a reasonable period of time.
144 Idaho at 57-58 (citing cases). Even if the starting date is not the filing of Stuart's
opening brief, as detailed above, the appointment of Chapman and the Federal Public
Defender's Unit years before the filing of Stuart's successive petition, establishes it was
not filed within a reasonable time after the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claims were known or reasonably could have been known.

3.

Because Stuart's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims Were Not
Timely Filed And Because Hoffman Is A Case Dealing With Exceptions
To The Federal Procedural Default Doctrine In Habeas Cases, Hoffman Is
Neither Controlling Nor Persuasive

Stuart concedes his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not timely filed
under I.C.

5

19-2719, but contends, under Hoffman, that he was prevented from timely

raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he was represented by Kinney
from trial through at least the first post-conviction proceedings. (Appellant's brief,
pp.16-18.)
However, in Hoffman, the Ninth Circuit was examining I.C. (i 19-2719 in the
context of federal habeas law, not state law, specifically the doctrine of procedural
default. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, I.C. (i 19-2719 provides a state procedural bar
that prevents capital litigants from raising claims for the first time in a federal habeas
petition., .dI

236 F.3d at 530. When I.C. 5 19-2719 is regularly and consistently applied

by Idaho courts, principles of comity and federalism prevent capital litigants from raising
first-time claims in federal court. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31
(1991); Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373,376 (9thCir. 1997) (quoting Morales v. Calderon, 85
F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1996)).

When state courts deviate from regularly and

consistently applying procedural bars, the federal courts disregard the bars and capital
litigants are permitted to skirt principles of comity and federalism by raising new claims
for the first time in federal habeas petitions. While the Ninth Circuit found that in
Hoffman's case I.C.

5

19-2719 frustrated his exercise of Sixth Amendment claims, the

court also found, "The Idaho Supreme Court has strictly construed the waiver provision
of the statute as limiting a capital defendant to 'one opportunity to raise all challenges to

the conviction and sentence in a petition for post-conviction relief except in 'unusual
cases."' Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 533.
Should this Court conclude it is no longer going to "strictly construem the waiver
provision," such a ruling would have an adverse impact on the state's ability to prevent
capital litigants from raising first-time claims in federal court, even when new counsel
has been appointed to represent capital litigants during the course of their first postconviction proceedings. While the Ninth Circuit concluded I.C. § 19-2719 fntstrated
Hoffman's exercise of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims when he was
represented by the same attorney at trial, sentencing, post-conviction and appeal, this is a
separate issue, relevant only in federal court to determine whether LC.

5 19-2719 is an

adequate and independent procedural bar. Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 530.
Additionally, Hoffman dealt with I.C. $ 19-2719 in the context of the forty-two
day time limit for filing ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims; it did not discuss
the requirement that claims which were not known and could not reasonably have been
known must be filed within a reasonable time period after they become known or
reasonably could have become known. Therefore, because Stuart failed to file his claims
within a reasonable time after being appointed new counsel, Hoffman is inapposite.

Stuart Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His Prosecutorial Misconduct
Claims Were Not Known Or Could Not Have Been Known When He Filed His First
Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Stuart raised the following four prosecutorial misconduct claims: (1) the

prosecutor advised a witness to say Stuart did not suffer from mental health difficulties;

(2) the prosecutor was aware that before testifying at the preliminary hearing, state
witnesses were ingesting small tab pills which allegedly had a "calming effect"; (3) the
state encouraged "prior bad acts witnesses to exchange their anticipated testimony" by
housing them in a hotel for the preliminary hearing and trial, bringing them into a single
room before the preliminary hearing and failing to advise them not to "exchange their
anticipated testimony"; and (4) the state encouraged "prior bad acts witnesses to
exaggerate" Stuarts misdeeds by "providing a heightened sense of danger" by providing a
"police presence at the witnesses' accommodations," relating to at least one witness that
the state had received calls from community members threatening Stuart, compelling
Stuart to wear leg irons at his preliminary hearing, and using heightened security
measures at trial.

(#34200, R., pp.7-8.)

Stuart also contends the state withheld

exculpatory evidence from Stuart's counsel, including interviews from witnesses that
could have allegedly supplied mitigation evidence. (#34200, R., pp.18-19.)
The district court determined Stuart's claims were known or reasonably could
have been known at the time he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. (#34200,

R., pp.652-54.)
Relying upon Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), Stuart contends he should be
excused from the requirements of I.C. § 19-2719 because, he contends, the Supreme
Court "has squarely rejected the position that petitioners who fail to discover facts
supporting claims in a timely manner waive those claims, even when the failure is due to
prosecutorial misdeeds." (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20.)
Stuart has greatly misstated the holding of

m,which was in an entirely

different procedural posture than Stuart's case. Because the claims were known or

reasonably could have been known when Stuart filed his first post-conviction petition,
they were properly dismissed by the district court. Even if the claims were not known or
could not reasonably have been known when his first petition was filed, like his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Stuart's prosecutorial misconduct claims were
not filed within a reasonable time after they were known or reasonably could have been
known. Because Stuart's petition is a successive petition in a capital case and he has
failed to comply with the dictates of I.C.

5

19-2719, the state expressly requests that his

appeal be dismissed.
B.

Standard Of Review
"When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon

h e provisions of Idaho Code

5

19-2719, the proper standard of review this Court should

utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of
section 19-2719 have been met, and rule accordingly." Hairston, 144 Idaho at 55.
C.

Stuart's Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Were Known Or Reasonably Could
Have Been Known When He Filed His First Petition
As explained in McKinnev, 133 Idaho at 706-07, "Even if the State violated

[Stuart's] right to due process . . . , [Stuart] was required to raise this issue, like other
constitutional issues, within the time frame mandated by I.C.

5

19-2719." See also

u r , 136 Idaho at 261. In a successive petition for post-conviction relief, Stuart is
required to "make the required prima facie showing that the issues could not reasonably
have been known during the first proceeding." McKinney, 133 Idaho at 707. Therefore,
the court must "initially examine[ ] whether the information alleged by [Stuart] to be

exculpatory reasonably should have been known at the time of [Stuart's] first postconviction petition."

Porter,136 Idaho at 261.

Stuart first contends, "The prosecution advised at least one witness not to say that
Mr. Stuart suffered from mental health difficulties." (#34200, R., p.8.) Stuart's claim is
based upon a statement allegedly signed by Theresa Jo Jacobson on October 28, 2002.
Likewise, his next three claims are also based upon the statement allegedly signed by
Theresa. This information was available to Stuart during the time of his trial and prior to
the filing of his first post-conviction petition. Theresa testified at Stuart's preliminary
hearing and his trial. She was listed as a witness on the Information (#14865, R., p.5) and
the Amended Information (#14865, R., p.16).

Stuart's counsel certainly had the

opportunity to interview Theresa and cross-examined her at both hearings.
The state is not mandated to spoon-feed information to Stuart or his attorneys.
The courts have recognized criminal defendants have a duty to exercise reasonable
diligence in obtaining and presenting evidence:
[Rlegardless of whether the evidence was material or even exculpatory,
when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and
his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court
is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.
United States v. Stuart, 150 F.3d 935, 937 (gth Cir. 1998); United States v. White, 970
F.2d 328, 337 (7" Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471,473 (5thCir.
1980)). The Ninth Circuit also recognizes situations in which "some defense diligence
[is] required." United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1250 (9thCir. 1978).
Further, Stuart and his counsel were obviously aware of the alleged "police
presence" during the preliminary hearing and trial. They would also have been aware of
Stuart allegedly being in leg irons at the time of his preliminary hearing. Because all of

this "evidence" was reasonably available to Stuart at the time of trial or the filing of his
first post-conviction petition, he has failed to establish these claims were not known or
reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition.
Stuart has also failed to establish his claim involving "exculpatory evidence" was
not known or reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first postconviction petition.

Stuart's claim is based, for the most part, upon transcripts of

interviews that were conducted during the course of the state's investigation. Stuart has
failed to establish those transcripts and interviews were not provided to Stuart and
Kinney. Like his other prosecutorial misconduct claims, this specific claim was known
or reasonably could have been known when Stuart filed his first post-conviction petition.
Based upon
showing under I.C.

m,Stuart contends he is not required to make a prima facie
8

19-2719 that his prosecutorial misconduct claims were known or

reasonably could have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition.
Banks initially raised claims that the state withheld exculpatory evidence in his third
post-conviction motion before the Texas post-conviction court., .dI

540 U.S. at 682.

After the state post-conviction court denied Banks's claims, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed.

Id. Banks then filed a federal habeas petition. Td. During federal

habeas proceedings, additional evidence was discovered that had not been provided to
Banks prior to his trial and which he contended was exculpatory. Id. 684-85. Because
some of that evidence was never presented in state court, the Fifth Circuit concluded the
claim was procedurally defaulted.

Id.at 688.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed Banks failed to produce some of the
evidence during state post-conviction proceedings and was procedurally defaulted.

Id.at

691. Therefore, Banks had to demonstrate "cause for his failure to develop the facts in
state-court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure."

Id. at

691.

Detailing the three components of a due process violation under Bradv v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), the Court explained, "cause and prejudice in this case 'parallel two of the
three components of the alleged Brady violation itself."'

Id.(quoting Strickler v. Greene,

527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). After reviewing the facts, the Court concluded, "Banks
had cause for failing to investigate, in state postconviction proceedings, Farr's
connections to Deputy Sheriff Huff."

Id. at

693. The Court reiterated, "The 'cause'

inquiry, we have also observed, turns on events or circumstances 'external to the
defense."'

Id.at 696 (quoting Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214,222 (1988)).
is inapposite, because whether Stuart has demonstrated "cause"

However,

under federal habeas standards is not the issue before this Court. Rather, the question is
whether Stuart knew or reasonably could have known of the claims when he filed his first
post-conviction petition. I.C.

5

19-2719(5). As explained in McKinney, 133 Idaho at

707-07, "Even if the State violated [Stuart's] right to due process . . . , [Stuart] was
required to raise this issue, like other constitutional issues, within the time frame
mandated by I.C.

3

19-2719." Stuart has provided no basis to deviate from well-settled

principles surrounding I.C.

19-2719, and should leave for the federal courts to

determine whether Stuart can establish cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural
default created by his failure to present these claims in his first post-conviction.
Because Stuart has failed to establish his "prosecutorial misconduct" claims were
not known or reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first postconviction petition, Stuart's claims must be dismissed.

D.

Stuart's Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Have Not Been Asserted Within A
Reasonable Time
Even if Stuart's prosecutorial misconduct claims were not and could not

reasonably have been known at the time of the filing of his first post-conviction petition,
they have not been asserted within a reasonable time after they were known or reasonably
could have been known. Stuart's successive post-conviction petition also fails to explain
when he became aware of the evidence upon which he bases his prosecutorial misconduct
claims. Based upon the same arguments regarding the timeliness of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, Stuart's prosecutorial misconduct claims are untimely and
were properly dismissed, requiring dismissal of this appeal.

Stuart Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719 Violates Ex Post Facto Laws Or Idaho's
Rules Regarding The Retroactivity Of New Statutory Laws
A.

Introduction
In an obvious attempt to circumvent the procedural bars associated with 1.C. § 19-

2719, Stuart first contends the statute violates federal and state ex post facto laws.
(Appellant's brief, pp.1-4.)

Stuart next contends I.C.

statutory prohibition in 1.C.

5

19-2719(3) violates Idaho's

73-101 regarding the retroactive application of new

statutory laws. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1-5.)
Because I.C.

5

19-2719 merely establishes the procedural mechanism for filing

and litigating successive post-conviction petitions in capital cases, it does not violate ex
post facto laws.

Additionally, because the legislature provided express language

regarding the retroactive application of I.C. 19-2719(3) in 1984, when it was initially
passed, Stuart's arguments regarding I.C. 3 73-101 are without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether a new law violates the ex post facto doctrine is an issue

of law over which the Court exercises free review. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 246,

C.

Stuart Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719 Violates Ex Post Facto Laws
Stuart contends, because he murdered Robert in 1981 prior to the legislative

enactment of I.C.

5

19-2719 in 1984, that application of the statute to his case would

constitute a violation of ex post facto laws. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1-4.)
The United States Constitution, article I,
1,

5 10, and the Idaho Constitution, article

5 16, prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws.

As explained in State v. Byers, the

United States Supreme Court has defined what constitutes an ex post facto law:
lst, every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense, in order to convict the offender.
102 Idaho 159, 166, 627 P.2d 788 (1981) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
390 (1798)).
The Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence has focused upon the third
category because such laws "implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause:
the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated." L ~ n c ev.

w,519 U.S. 433, 441

(1997) (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
As explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,293 (1977) (internal quotes and
citations omitted) (emphasis added), the Ex Post Facto Clause generally does not apply to
procedural matters:
It is equally well settled, however, that the inhibition upon the
passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed.
The constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not
affect matters of substance.
Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a
procedural change is not ex post facto.
The Supreme Court has identified "two critical elements [that] must be present for
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected
by it." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (footnote omitted). However, "no ex
post facto violation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does not
increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts
necessary to establish guilt."

Id.at 29 n.12.

"Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto

Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and
governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was
prescribed when the crime was consummated."

Id.at 29 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), narrowed
what constitutes an ex post facto violation by overruling several prior cases. After the
defendant was sentenced, the Texas legislature amended the remedy that was available

when an unauthorized fine was imposed at sentencing. Under the law at the time the
defendant was sentenced, if the law did not authorize the fine, the judgment and sentence
were void and the defendant was entitled to a new trial.

Id.at 39.

After Youngblood was

sentenced, new legislation was enacted permitting the appellate court to merely reform an
improper verdict, thereby eliminating the new trial remedy.

Id. at

40. The Supreme

Court reiterated that procedural changes do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Id.at

45. The Court reasoned, "While these cases do not explicitly define what they mean by
the word 'procedural,' it is logical to think that the term refers to changes in the
procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the
substantive law of crimes."

Id. at

45. The Court concluded the new statute "is a

procedural change that allows reformation of improper verdicts. It does not alter the
definition of the crime of aggravated sexual abuse, . . . nor does it increase the
punishment for which he is eligible."

Id.at 44 (emphasis added).

The Court explained

that language from other cases discussing whether a procedural change may violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause if it deprived a defendant of "substantial protections" or infringed
upon "substantial personal rights" had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause."

Id.at 45.

Idaho's appellate courts have followed the Supreme Court cases detailed above.

See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 77-78, 90 P.3d 298 (2004). In Mellinger v. State,
113 Idaho 31, 34, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987), the Idaho Court. of Appeals quoted
Dobbert, in concluding that a change in the statute of limitations in Idaho's UPCPA was
procedural in nature and did not materially affect the petitioner's substantial rights. See
also LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1991); Es~uivelv.

m,128 Idaho

390, 913 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1996). The Idaho Supreme Court

expressly adopted Mellinger in State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 247, 796 P.2d 121
(1990). In Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 227, 912 P.2d 110 (1996), the Idaho Supreme
Court applied the rationale of O'Neill in a capital case.
This sane analysis has also been applied to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which was enacted by Congress in 1996 and significantly
changed the manner in which federal habeas cases are litigated and limited the cases in
which the federal courts can grant habeas relief. The federal courts have uniformly held
that, because the changes made by the AEDPA are procedural in nature, they do not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Libbv v, Magnusson, 177 F.3d 43, 46-47 (1'' Cir.
1999); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 560 (6Ih Cir. 2000); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d
917, 921 (1 1' Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Tavlor, 529 U.S.
362 (2000)); United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Similar analysis was used in Mitchell v. State, 934 P.2d 346, 349 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1997), when the petitioner challenged amendments to Oklahoma's capital postconviction statutes. The court explained that, because such changes were "procedural in
nature," they did not violate the ex post facto clause.
Likewise, the enactment of I.C.

5

Id.

19-2719 was procedural in nature. The statute

"neither made criminal a theretofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime previously
committed, nor provided a greater punishment, nor changed the proof necessary to
convict." Seymour, 224 F.3d at 560 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293). Rather, "these
provisions simply limit the circumstances under which [Stuart] may collaterally attack his
conviction." Libby, 177 F.3d at 46. In fact, in McKinnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 703,

992 P.2d 144 (1999), this Court implied I.C.

5

19-2719 is procedural in nature when it

stated, "The operation of I.C. $ 19-2719 is not limited by the existence of previous
proceedings using different procedural rules."
Further, Stuart cannot complain of a lack of fair notice or prejudice. After his
first appeal, but prior to the filing of his first post-conviction petition, the Idaho Supreme
Court expressly advised Stuart that his post-conviction proceedings would be governed
by the dictates of I.C. 5 19-2719. (#17014, R., pp.150-51.)
Because Stuart has failed to establish an ex post facto violation, his successive
petition is governed by I.C.

5

19-2719, which required the dismissal of his claims

because of his failure to meet the mandates of that statute.

D.

The Legislature Has Stated Its Clear Intent That I.C. 6 19-2719(3) Be Applied
Retroactively
Stuart contends, "I.C.

5

19-2719(3) is inapplicable because when enacted in its

current version in 2001, it did not include any express language that it is to be
retroactively applied."

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

Because it is unnecessary for the

legislature to reassert the original statute is to be applied retroactively when a new
amendment is added, Stuart's argument is without merit.
Idaho law "prohibits the retroactive application of newly passed legislation."
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 804, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) (citing I.C.
However, I.C.

5 73-101).

5 73-101 provides an exception when the legislature declares its intent to

make a new rule of law retroactive.

Id. As explained in Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Cow.,

113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18, (1987) (emphasis added), "an amendment to an

existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the contrary, be held
to be retroactive in application."
When the legislature enacted I.C.

5

19-2719 in 1984, it included the relevant

portion of section (3), which reads as follows, "Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of
the judgment imposing the punishment of death, and before the death warrant is filed, the
defendant must file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is
known or reasonably should be known." 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 389. This portion of
the statute is the same even today. At the time I.C. 5 19-2719 was passed, the legislature
also expressly stated:
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were
imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act but which have not
been carried out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of
this act.
1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 390.
This language clearly states the legislature's intent to make I.C.

5

19-2719(3)

retroactive to all capital cases. However, without citation to any authority, Stuart
contends, "The 1984 version's declaration of retroactive affect has no application here
because it was not in effect at the time petitioner filed the instant postconviction petition.
Rather, the statute in effect at the time the petition was filed governs." (Appellant's brief,
pp.4-5.) Stuart's argument ignores the fact that it is the "amendment to an existing
statute" that is not given retroactive application, not the pre-existing statute for which the
legislature has already provided retroactive application. Nebeker, 113 Idaho at 614. In
fact, the legislature's directive regarding I.C. 19-2719(3) has been recognized by this
Court, "The operation of I.C.

5

19-2719 is not limited to the existence of previous

proceedings using different procedural rules. The provisions of I.C. 5 19-2719 apply to

all cases in which capital sentences were imposed on or prior to the effective date [April

2, 19841." McKinney, 133 Idaho at 703 (internal quotations and citations omitted)
(brackets and emphasis in original).
Because of the legislature's express intent language in 1984, when the new statute
was enacted, Stuart's argument regarding the retroactivity of I.C. $ 19-2719(3) fails,
requiring the dismissal of his successive claims because of his failure to meet the
mandates of I.C. $ 19-2719.

Stuarl Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719(5) Violates Idaho's Retroactivity Doctrine.
Idaho's Separation Of Powers Doctrine, Due Process Or Equal Protection
A.

Introduction
Stuart initially contends I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c) violates Idaho's statutory prohibition

in I.C. $ 73-101 regarding the retroactive application of new statutory laws. (Appellant's
brief, pp.6-8.) He further contends I.C. $ 19-2719(5) violates Idaho's separation of
powers doctrine. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Finally, he contends I.C.

5

19-2719(5)

violates his due process and equal protection rights, and is unconstitutionally vague
because it "imposes an internally inconsistent standard of 'known' or 'should reasonably
have been known,' in subsection (5) versus a standard of reasonably 'could' have been
known in subsection (5)(a)" making it "impossible to glean from the statute or case law
regarding [the] 19-2719 waiver standard what 'should reasonably have been known'
requires." (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-13.)

B.

Standard Of Review
Questions of statutory or constitutional construction or interpretation are

questions of law over which the appellate courts exercise free review. Osmunson v.
State, 135 Idaho 292, 294, 17 P.3d 236 (2000); State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 446, 807
P.2d 1282 (Ct. App. 1991).
C.

The Legislature Has Stated Its Clear Intent That I.C.
Retroactively

6 19-2719(5) Be A~olied

Like I.C. § 19-2719(3), Stuart contends I.C. 5 19-2719(5) cannot be retroactively
applied because the legislature did not include retroactive language when subsection (a)
was added in 2001. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Like subsection (3), when the legislature
enacted I.C.

5

19-2719 in 1984, it included the relevant portion of section (5), which

reads as follows, "If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and
within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief
as were known, or reasonably should have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have
no power to consider any such claim for relief as have been so waived or grant any such
relief."

1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 389. This portion of the statute is the same today.

Therefore, as explained above, because the legislature expressly included language that
the statute should be applied retroactively, 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 390, Stuart's argument
is without merit.5

TOthe extent Stuart is also contending I.C. 5 19-2719(5) vioIates ex post facto laws, the
state also relies upon that portion of its brief dealing with ex post facto laws and I.C. 5
19-2719(3).

D.

Stuart Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719(5) Violates Idaho's Separation Of
Powers Doctrine
Stuart contends I.C.

5

19-2719(5) violates Idaho's separation of powers doctrine

because it "limit[s] the constitutionally defined original jurisdiction of the district court."
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) While Idaho's appellate courts have not directly addressed this
issue in the context of I.C.

5

19-2719(5), it has been addressed in the context of state

habeas corpus.
In Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 280,392 P.2d 279 (1964), the Idaho Supreme
Court explained that because the writ of habeas corpus is expressly recognized in Idaho's
constitution, "the writ is not a statutory remedy."

The court concluded, "While the

legislature (absent certain contingencies) is without power to abridge this remedy secured
by the Constitution, it may add to the efficacy of the writ. Statutes are usually enacted
for this purpose and should be construed so as to promote the effectiveness of the
proceeding." @. Addressing the enactment of the UPCPA, the supreme court concluded
the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho
235,237,459 P.2d 1017 (1969).
Because the UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus and the
legislature is not barred from adding to the efficacy of the writ, it naturally follows that

LC.

3 19-2719(5) does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction in violation of

the separation of powers doctrine. Rather, I.C. ij 19-2719(5) merely establishes the
parameters in which relief may be granted when a successive post-conviction petition has
been filed. As explained in Kirkland v. Blaine Countv Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464,471,
4 P.3d 1115 (2000):

Because it is properly within the power of the legislature to establish
statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and
otherwise modify the common law without violating separation of powers
principles, it necessarily follows that the legislature also has the power to
limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating the separation of
powers doctrine.
Because the legislature has the power to limit the remedies available to plaintiffs,
it necessarily has the power to limit the remedies of capital petitioners in seeking postconviction relief.

Stuart has failed to establish 1.C. § 19-2719(5) results in a

constitutional violation under the separation of powers doctrine.
E.

Stuart Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719(5) Violates Due Process, Equal
Protection Or Is Unconstitutionallv Vague
Stuart contends I.C. $ 19-2719(5) violates his equal protection and due process

rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 21 1-13, 766 P.2d
678 (1988), the Court expressly held I.C. § 19-2719 does not violate equal protection. In
State' v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), the Court expressly
concluded I.C. § 19-2719 does not violate due process. The Idaho Supreme Court has
repeatedly affirmed both of these cases. See Hairston, 144 Idaho at 55; Lankford v. State,
127 Idaho 100, 102, 897 P.2d 991 (1995);. State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 647, 851
P.2d 934 (1993); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 430-31, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v.
Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960 (1991); Paz v. State, 118 Idaho 542, 559, 798
P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 235-36, 765 P.2d 701 (1988). Because
Stuart has failed to even cite these cases, he obviously has failed to provide any argument
as to why they are not controlling or should be reconsidered.
Stuart's

contention regarding

I.C.

$

19-2719(5) and

whether

it

is

unconstitutionally vague has likewise been addressed by this Court in Hairston, 144

Idaho at 57. Because Stuart has failed to even cite Hairston, he obviously has failed to
provide any argument as to why it is not controlling or should be reconsidered.

Stuart Is Precluded From Circumventing I.C. 6 19-2719 By Challenging The Validity Of
His Conviction Or Sentence Via A Writ Of Habeas Corpus
Stuart attempts to salvage the claims in his successive post-conviction petition by
alternatively characterizing it as a "Writ of Habeas Corpus." (Appellant's brief, pp.1315.) This Court, in Porter v. State, 140 Idaho, 780, 783, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004), which
again is not cited let alone distinguished by Stuart, expressly rejected this argument.
However, even if Stuart's claims in his successive petition could be raised in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district court was without jurisdiction to hear his
claims. Idaho Code 5 19-4202 expressly grants original jurisdiction to consider a petition
for writ of habeas corpus to the Idaho Supreme Court or "[tlhe district court of the county
in which the person is detained." In Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001),
the district court dismissed a habeas claim based upon the length and conditions of the
petitioner's confinement. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed Row's claim
because she filed the petition in Ada County, but was being detained at the Pocatello
Women's Correctional Center.

Id.135 Idaho at 580.

As detailed in Stuart's successive petition, he is being detained at the Idaho
Maximum Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. (#34200, R., p.9.) Therefore, only the
court in Ada County had jurisdiction to hear any claims that are part of a petition for writ
of habeas corpus.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that Stuart's appeal be dismissed or, alternatively,
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed on appeal.
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